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I develop a view of the common factor between subjectively indistinguishable per-
ceptions and hallucinations that avoids analyzing experiences as involving aware-
ness relations to abstract entities, sense-data, or any other peculiar entities. The
main thesis is that hallucinating subjects employ concepts (or analogous noncon-
ceptual structures), namely the very same concepts that in a subjectively indistin-
guishable perception are employed as a consequence of being related to external,
mind-independent objects or property-instances. These concepts and nonconceptual
structures are identified with modes of presentation types. Since a hallucinating
subject is not related to any such objects or property-instances, the concepts she
employs remain empty. I argue that the phenomenology of hallucinations and per-
ceptions can be identified with employing concepts and analogous nonconceptual
structures. By doing so, I defend an ontologically minimalist view of the phenome-
nology of experience that (1) vindicates Aristotelianism about types and (2)
amounts to a naturalized view of the phenomenology of experience.
Galileo: Vision is perfect. People have very good eyes.
Apicius: Whose weak eyes, then, need the help of your lenses?
Galileo: They are the eyes of the philosophers.
Fontenelle, Dialogues des morts, 1683
When a subject sees an object instantiating certain properties, it is
natural to say that it seems to her that she is seeing an object
instantiating those properties because she is perceptually related to
that very object and those very property-instances. So when she sees
a white cup, it seems to her that there is a white cup precisely
because she is perceptually related to a white cup. By definition,
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when a subject is hallucinating, she is not perceptually related to the
external, mind-independent object that her experience is seemingly of.
If she is suffering a non-veridical hallucination, it seems to her that
there is a particular object, such as a white cup, where in fact there
is none. Since she is not perceptually related to a white cup, the fact
that it seems to her that there is a white cup present cannot be
explained in virtue of a perceptual relation to an external, mind-inde-
pendent object and the properties it instantiates. So how should we
explain the phenomenology of hallucinations? Let’s call this the hallu-
cination question. Many differences between philosophical views of
perceptual experience can be traced back to how this question is
answered.
There are two standard ways of answering the hallucination ques-
tion. One common response is to argue that a hallucinating subject
stands in an awareness relation to a peculiar entity. This peculiar entity
has been understood to be an abstract entity, such as a property-cluster,
an (uninstantiated) universal, an intentional object, or a proposition. It
has also been understood to be a strange particular, such as a sense-
datum, a quale, or a Meinongian object.1 As Dretske formulates the
idea: ‘‘hallucinations are experiences in which one is aware of proper-
ties. … Can we really be aware of (uninstantiated) universals? Yes, we
can, and, yes, we sometimes are’’ (2000, p. 162–3). Similarly, Tye
writes: ‘‘[i]n attending to the color of the ball, you are directly aware of
1 For views according to which hallucinating subjects stand in awareness or acquain-
tance relations to property-clusters, see Johnston 2004; for intentional objects, see
Harman 1990, Lycan 1996; for propositions, see Russell 1913; for sense-data, see
Robinson 1994; for qualia, see Block 2003; for Meinongian objects, see Parsons
1980. It is important to note that one could argue that hallucinating subjects repre-
sent intentional objects without arguing that the subjects stand in awareness or
acquaintance relations to such objects. For a defense of such a view, see Crane
1998. Similarly, one can argue that the phenomenology of hallucinations is consti-
tuted by qualia without arguing that hallucinating subjects stand in awareness or
acquaintance relations to these qualia. For a defense of such a view, see Chalmers
1996, McLaughlin 2007, and Shoemaker 2007. Finally, one can argue that the con-
tent of a hallucination is a Russellian proposition without arguing that hallucinat-
ing subjects stand in awareness or acquaintance relations to these propositions or
their constituents. Byrne (2001) and Pautz (2007) defend versions of such a view.
Arguably, any view that aims to explain phenomenology in virtue of properties or
objects that constitute the content of experience is committed to positing that the
experiencing subject stands in an awareness or acquaintance relation to these prop-
erties or objects. For a defense of this thesis, see Crane 2006, p. 128ff. It would
lead too far afield to discuss here to what extent such views are peculiar entity
views. I will reserve this for another occasion. For the purposes of this paper, any
view that denies that subjects stand in awareness or acquaintance relations to pecu-
liar entities is not my target. I will address such views only to the extent that they
face the same problems as peculiar entity views.
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a certain quality, Q, as covering that surface. … If the ball does not
exist [you are hallucinating], still you are directly aware of Q. … the
phenomenal character involves the surface qualities of which the sub-
ject of the visual experience is directly aware’’ (2002, p. 141). With
‘peculiar entity’ I mean any object that is not an external, mind-inde-
pendent object, such as a cat, cup, or a carrot; and any property that
cannot be analyzed in terms of external, mind-independent property-
instances, such as the whiteness or shape of the cup on my desk, or
relations to such property-instances. Let’s call a view according to
which a hallucinating subject stands in an awareness relation to an
entity that is not a material, mind-independent object or property-
instance, a peculiar entity view. Peculiar entity views have it that since
hallucinating subjects are aware of something, they must stand in an
awareness relation to something that accounts for this phenomenology.
So such views operate with a particular understanding of what it means
to be aware of something. By distinguishing between extensional and
intensional awareness, I will argue that one can acknowledge that hal-
lucinating subjects are aware of something without analyzing ‘‘aware-
ness of’’ in terms of an awareness relation to an object, property, or
any other entity.
A second way of responding to the hallucination question is to stip-
ulate that a hallucination could be subjectively indistinguishable from a
perception, but to leave unexplained how this could be possible (e.g.
Snowdon 1981, Campbell 2002).2 Let’s call such a view negativism
about hallucinations. Negativist views avoid introducing peculiar enti-
ties of which hallucinating subjects are aware, but at the cost of leaving
unexplained just what accounts for the phenomenology of hallucina-
tions and how a hallucination could be subjectively indistinguishable
from a perception.
There are many ways of understanding the claim that two experi-
ences are subjectively indistinguishable. Williamson (1990) uses the
expression to pick out an epistemic notion. In short, the idea is that
two experiences e1 and e2 are subjectively indistinguishable for a subject
if and only if she is not able to know by introspection alone that e1
and e2 are not the same. I will follow this use. I will not argue here
that the possible subjective indistinguishability of a hallucination and a
perception needs to be explained. In the context of this paper, I will
2 Of course, it need not be a positive part of the view that the possible subjective
indistinguishability of a hallucination and a perception is not something that
requires explanation. What characterizes negativism is the fact that the view does
not explain possible subjective indistinguishability. Negativist views could fail to
explain this due to neglect or since the defender of the view holds that possible sub-
jective indistinguishability is something that does not require explanation.
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take this for granted. Indeed, I will posit that any account of experi-
ence should explain the possibility that a perception and a hallucina-
tion can (seemingly) have the same phenomenology and thus be
subjectively indistinguishable.3 Call this the indistinguishability desidera-
tum.
The distinction between the way the peculiar entity view and nega-
tivism answer the hallucination question is orthogonal to the distinc-
tion between two fundamentally different ways of thinking about the
relation between hallucinations and accurate perceptions. Disjunctivists
and naı¨ve realists characterize hallucinations in terms of a deficiency of
an accurate perception and argue that perceptions and hallucinations
do not share a common element.4 By contrast, common factor views
have it that perceptions and subjectively indistinguishable hallucina-
tions share a common element that accounts for the phenomenology of
the experiences. Although the two distinctions are orthogonal, most
peculiar entity views are common factor views and most negativist
views are versions of disjunctivism. The fault line between disjunctivism
and common factor views does not however coincide with the fault line
between negativism and peculiar entity views. There are for instance
views on which hallucinations—but not perceptions—are a matter of
being related to a peculiar entity (e.g. Johnston 2004). So there are
peculiar entity views on which hallucinations and perceptions do not
share a common element. However, with the aim of giving a common
account of both perception and hallucination, most peculiar entities
views posit that a perceiving subject is related to the very same (or the
very same kind of) peculiar entity that she would be related to, were
she hallucinating.
My aim is to present a positive view of hallucinations that satisfies
the indistinguishability desideratum without endorsing the thesis that
perceptions or hallucinations are a matter of standing in an awareness
relation to a peculiar entity. I will pursue this aim by arguing that per-
ceptions and subjectively indistinguishable hallucinations share a com-
mon element that accounts for the subjective indistinguishability of the
3 It should be noted that Campbell (2002) denies that a hallucination has the same
phenomenology as a perception in the metaphysical sense. However, even he con-
cedes that a hallucination could be subjectively indistinguishable from a perception
in the epistemic sense, given that the experiencing subject may not be able to tell
that there is a metaphysical difference between her experiences.
4 Naı¨ve realism is a new-fangled version of disjunctivism. By contrast to most tradi-
tional disjunctivists, naı¨ve realists deny not only that hallucinations have content,
but are moreover skeptical that perceptions have content. Campbell (2002), Travis
(2004), and Brewer (2006) argue explicitly that perceptions do not have content.
For ease of presentation, I will speak only of disjunctivism, but everything I say
about disjunctivism generalizes to naı¨ve realism.
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experiences, while acknowledging that hallucinations exhibit a defi-
ciency that can only be explained with reference to accurate percep-
tions. So I will defend a common factor view that does not amount to
a peculiar entity view and that recognizes the disjunctivist insight that
hallucinations are deficient. The main thesis is that hallucinating sub-
jects employ concepts (or analogous nonconceptual structures), namely
the very same concepts that in a subjectively indistinguishable percep-
tion are employed as a consequence of the perceiving subject being
related to external, mind-independent objects and property-instances.
Since a subject who suffers a non-veridical hallucination is not percep-
tually related to the external, mind-independent objects or property-
instances that it seems to her are present, the concepts she employs
remain empty. As a consequence, hallucinations are deficient. Insofar
as the concepts employed in hallucinations are grounded in perceptions
and can only be analyzed with regard to their role in perceptions, hal-
lucinations are derivative of perceptions.
In §1, I will critically discuss disjunctivism and those versions of the
common factor view on which experiential states are awareness rela-
tions to peculiar entities. In §2, I will develop a view of the phenome-
nology of experience that circumvents the need to think of experiences
in terms of awareness relations to peculiar entities. I will call it onto-
logical minimalism about phenomenology. In §3, I will discuss the
notion of content that this view implies. In §4, I will respond to five
objections to the view.
First, it is necessary to make a few terminological remarks. When I
speak of an experience without qualification, I mean an experience that
is a perception, a hallucination, or an illusion. When I speak of objects
without further qualifications, I mean material, mind-independent
objects, such as cats, cups, or carrots.
1. Disjunctivism and the Common Factor View
Disjunctivists take as their starting point the perceptual relation
between subject and object in the case of an accurate perception and
argue that perception is fundamentally a perceptual relation to an
object. When a subject s perceives an object o, she stands in a percep-
tual relation R to that very object o. So perception has the form Rso.
Since a hallucinating subject is not perceptually related to an object, or
at least not the one that it seems to her she is related to, a hallucina-
tion could not possibly share the Rso-form of perception. So disjunctiv-
ists conceive of the structure of perception in a way that a
hallucination could not possibly share. As a result they argue that there
is no common element between hallucinations and perceptions.
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There are at least two problems with such a view that are of immedi-
ate relevance for present purposes. A first problem is that if phenome-
nology is explained in terms of perceptual relations to the very objects
that the experiencing subject sees and the properties that this object
instantiates, then it is unclear what accounts for the phenomenology of
hallucinations. A hallucinating subject is not perceptually related to the
object that it seems to her is present. So the phenomenology of her
experience cannot be explained simply in terms of perceptual relations
to objects and the properties they instantiate. A second problem is that,
if the fundamental structure of perception is one that a hallucination
could not possible share, then it is unclear how the indistinguishability
desideratum could be satisfied.5 Obviously, there is much more to be
said about these problems. I cannot here do justice to the subtleties of
disjunctivism.6 Rather than further pursue a discussion of disjunctivism,
I will assume that these two problems are problems and focus on devel-
oping a view that avoids them without positing that hallucinating sub-
jects are aware of peculiar entities.
In contrast to disjunctivism, common factor views argue that there
is a common element between perceptions and subjectively indistin-
guishable hallucinations. There are many different versions of this view.
Indeed there are at least as many different versions as there are differ-
ent ways of conceiving of the common element, multiplied by the dif-
ferent possible ways of understanding the additional element that
distinguishes hallucinations from perceptions. Adverbialism has it that
being appeared to F-ly is the common element between perceiving and
hallucinating an F (Chisholm 1957). Adverbialism is a view according
to which hallucinations and perceptions share a common element, with-
out that common element constituting a peculiar entity. On sense-
datum theory, the common element is a sense-datum, that is, a concrete
particular that has just the properties of which the experiencing subject
is aware (Price 1950, Moore 1953, Jackson 1977, Robinson 1994). Qua-
lia theory argues that the common element is a quale (e.g. Block 1990,
Chalmers 1996). All three views have been criticized widely (e.g.
5 Martin (2002) argues that a hallucination that is subjectively indistinguishable from
a perception instantiates an indistinguishability property in virtue of which it is
subjectively indistinguishable from the perception. More specifically, he argues that
our epistemic situation with regard to our experience is the same regardless of
whether we are perceiving or hallucinating. Arguably, this does not constitute an
explanation of what accounts for the hallucination being subjectively indistinguish-
able and so such an account does not satisfy what we have called the indistinguish-
ability desideratum. For a discussion of Martin’s indistinguishability properties, see
Siegel 2004.
6 For detailed discussions, see Haddock and Macpherson 2008, Siegel 2008, and my
forthcoming-a.
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Strawson 1979, Smith 2002, Johnston 2004, Crane 2006) and I have
nothing substantial to add to their criticisms. I will focus on those ver-
sions of the peculiar entity view on which the experiencing subject
stands in an awareness relation to an abstract entity. In particular, I
will concentrate on property-cluster views.
According to the property-cluster view an experiencing subject is
related to a property-cluster regardless of whether she is perceiving
or hallucinating. There are at least three versions of this view. On
what I will call a pure property-cluster view, experience does not
have content. It is simply a matter of being related to a property-
cluster. On what I will call a content property-cluster view, experience
is a matter of being related to a Russellian proposition that is con-
stituted by a property-cluster and possibly one or more objects.
There are two versions of the content property-cluster view. On the
standard view, perceptions and subjectively indistinguishable halluci-
nations are analyzed in terms of relations to the very same (or the
very same kind of) Russellian proposition. On a gappy version of
the view, the content of a hallucination is gappy in the object-place
because an object is missing, while the gap is filled by an object in
the case of a perception.7
Not all of these views rely on awareness relations to abstract
objects. However, as I will argue shortly, any property-cluster view
requires that the property-cluster is potentially constituted by unin-
stantiated universals to avoid facing obvious counterexamples. In the
rest of this section, I will present an argument against those versions
of the common factor view according to which hallucinating subjects
stand in an awareness relation to an abstract entity. I will focus first
on the pure property-cluster view and will then discuss the extent to
which the problems facing this view arise for content property-cluster
views.
Since the property-cluster view is most famously associated with
Johnston, it will be helpful to make a few clarifying remarks about his
account to begin. Johnston’s view is summed up in the following pas-
sage:
When we see we are aware of instantiations of sensible profiles.
When we hallucinate we are aware merely of the structured
qualitative parts of such sensible profiles. Any case of
7 The pure property-cluster view is defended by Johnston (2004); for the content
property-cluster view, see Tye 2000, Byrne 2001, and Pautz 2007 among others; for
the gappy content property-cluster view, see Bach 2007 and Tye 2007. I defend a
gappy content view (see my 2006), but one that is not a version of the property-
cluster view.
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hallucination is thus a case of ‘‘direct’’ visual awareness of less
than one would be ‘‘directly’’ aware of in the corresponding
case of seeing. (2004, p. 137)
As Johnston argues, when we hallucinate, we are aware of an uninstan-
tiated property-cluster, that is, a structured qualitative part of a sensi-
ble profile. When we perceive, we are aware of a property-cluster
instantiated by an external, mind-independent object, that is, an instan-
tiated sensible profile. Instantiations of sensible profiles and structured
qualitative parts of sensible profiles are not the same things. Given that
they are not the same things, there is no reason to think that they
amount to a common factor. If they do not amount to a common fac-
tor, then Johnston’s view is a version of disjunctivism.8 For the sake of
clarity, I will work with an idealized version of a property-cluster view
on which a hallucinating subject is related to the very same property-
cluster regardless of whether she is hallucinating or perceiving. Every-
thing I will say about the idealized version generalizes to versions of
the property-cluster view on which there are differences between what
the subject is related to when she is hallucinating and what she is
related to when she is perceiving. So everything I will say about the
idealized version generalizes to Johnston’s property-cluster view.
Consider a subject s who has a non-veridical hallucination as of a
material, mind-independent object o that seems to be instantiating
property P at location L. Since there is no object o at location L, there
is no object that could be instantiating P. Therefore, what the subject
is aware of can neither be the material, mind-independent object o, nor
the properties instantiated by such a material, mind-independent object.
The property-cluster view has it that hallucinating subjects stand in an
awareness relation to properties that are not instantiated where the
subject experiences them to be instantiated. Since these properties are
not instantiated where they are experienced to be, they are conceived
of as universals. This view is phenomenologically controversial since
universals are abstract entities. Abstract entities are not spatially
extended and it is not clear what it would be to be sensorily aware of
something that is not spatially extended.9 At least phenomenally, it is
more plausible to say that when one experiences a white cup, one is
aware of an instance of whiteness, not an abstract entity.10
8 For a critical discussion of Johnston’s view along these lines, see also Pautz 2007.
9 A second way that one may question the possibility of sensory awareness of
abstract entities is by arguing that such awareness requires causation and universals
do not cause. For an excellent discussion of the problem of sensory awareness of
abstract entities and possible solutions to it, see Pautz 2007.
10 For a classical defense of this thesis, see Williams 1953.
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There are several possible ways for the property-cluster theorist to
respond to the criticism that the view is phenomenologically contro-
versial. She might distinguish between being sensorily and cognitively
aware of something. This would allow her to argue that hallucinat-
ing subjects are cognitively aware of abstract entities, while perceiv-
ing subjects are sensorily aware of the objects and property-instances
to which they are perceptually related. Even if we would grant, for
the sake of argument, that one could be cognitively aware of
abstract entities, this response to the phenomenological worry raised
above faces a second phenomenological problem. Arguably, being
cognitively aware of something is phenomenally distinct from
being sensorily aware of something. If this is right, then it is not
clear how such an approach would satisfy the indistinguishability
desideratum.
The property-cluster view could circumvent this second phenomeno-
logical problem by arguing that subjects are cognitively aware of
abstract entities regardless of whether they are perceiving or hallucinat-
ing. This way of dealing with the problem faces several worries. One
worry is that perceptual experience is assimilated too strongly to
thought. A second worry is that while non-rational animals can per-
ceive, it is not clear that they can be cognitively aware of abstract enti-
ties. A third worry is how such a view can account for the particular
sensory character of experiences. There are several options for the
property-cluster theorist to proceed from this point. But any option
will involve positing that hallucinating subjects are either cognitively or
sensorily aware of abstract entities. Arguably, this is reason enough to
be at the very least wary of the view.
The property-cluster view is not only phenomenologically contro-
versial, it is moreover metaphysically controversial. To show why,
let’s assume for a moment an Aristotelian view of types, that is, a
view that is committed to the principle that the existence of a type
depends on its tokens, where the tokens depend in turn on concrete
entities of the physical world insofar as the tokens are for instance
instantiated by concrete physical entities. We can call this the Aristo-
telian principle. This principle implies that any type must be tokened
somewhere and that it must be possible to analyze any token in terms
of concrete entities of the physical world. Applied to properties, the
Aristotelian principle implies that any property must be instantiated
somewhere.
A property-cluster theorist who accepts the Aristotelian principle
will have to constrain possible hallucinations to hallucinations of
properties that are instantiated somewhere in the actual world. But
by doing so her view faces a whole range of counterexamples. It is
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easy to conceive of hallucinations of uninstantiated properties, that is,
properties that are not instantiated anywhere. Examples are hallucina-
tions of Hume’s missing shade of blue and hallucinations of supersat-
urated red. Not only are such hallucinations conceivable, they are
easy to produce.11
The property-cluster theorist could account for hallucinations of
uninstantiated properties by rejecting the Aristotelian principle and by
arguing that hallucinating subjects are at least sometimes related to un-
instantiated universals.12 However by doing so, she commits herself to
a controversial metaphysical view of types. The view is metaphysically
controversial since accepting the existence of uninstantiated universals
requires some kind of Platonic ‘two realms’-view on which there is
more to reality than what can be analyzed in terms of what exists in
the concrete physical world. There are universals that cannot be ana-
lyzed in terms of their instances in the concrete physical world or in
terms of any other concrete physical entities. The rival Aristotelian
view that requires universals to be analyzable in terms of concrete
physical entities can do without such a Platonic heaven. By understand-
ing abstract entities such as universals in terms of their instances, the
Aristotelian view can accept the existence of abstract entities, while
denying that subjects are ever aware of anything other than the
instances of these abstract entities.13
11 See Ffytche and Howard (1999) and Ffytche (2008).
12 When I speak of an uninstantiated universal, I mean—following common use—a
universal that is not instantiated anywhere. It is important to distinguish an unin-
stantiated universals from a universal that is instantiated somewhere, but not
instantiated where a subject who suffers an illusion or hallucination experiences it
to be instantiated.
13 For a critical discussion of uninstantiated universals, see Armstrong 1989. Arm-
strong restricts the Aristotelian principle to so-called sparse properties. By contrast,
I aim to vindicate the Aristotelian principle for all perceivable properties. One
might object that the metaphysical problem articulated over-generalizes in that it
would work just as well against Russellian accounts of the content of false beliefs.
The metaphysical problem articulated is specific to accounts of perceptual experi-
ence that analyze experience in terms of awareness relations to (uninstantiated)
abstract entities. If experience is analyzed in terms of awareness relations to (unin-
stantiated) abstract entities, then these (uninstantiated) abstract entities must exist
such that we could stand in an awareness relation to them. The same is not true of
beliefs of abstract entities, since there is no reason why a belief as of o must be
analyzed in terms of an awareness relation to o. If however beliefs are analyzed in
terms of awareness relations to (uninstantiated) abstract entities, then the phenome-
nological and metaphysical problems articulated would indeed arise for such an
account of beliefs. Thanks to Nico Silins for pressing me on this point. As I will
show in the next section, any view that analyzes the phenomenology of perceptual
experience in terms of an awareness relation to (uninstantiated) abstract entities
should and can be avoided.
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To what extent does the content property-cluster view inherit the
problems of the pure property-cluster view? Any view on which the
content of experience is constituted by naked properties and objects
inherits the metaphysical problem of the pure property-cluster view.
For the gappy content property-cluster view, this problem manifests
itself in the following way. Let’s assume again for a moment the Aris-
totelian principle. Given this assumption, the defender of this view
faces an unfortunate choice point. (i) He can deny that hallucinations
of uninstantiated properties are possible. This first strategy faces the
counterexamples of hallucinations of uninstantiated properties such as
supersaturated red. (ii) Alternatively, he can accept that hallucinations
of such properties are possible and argue that they have the content
<__, __>. The content is gappy in both the object and property-place
since the subject neither stands in an awareness relation to any mind-
independent object nor any properties. This second strategy implies
that any hallucination of uninstantiated properties will have the very
same content. So a hallucination of supersaturated red will have the
very same content as a hallucination of Hume’s missing shade of blue.
If the content of experience is supposed to ground the phenomenology
of the relevant experience, then such a view of content will predict that
a hallucination of supersaturated red will have the very same phenome-
nology as a hallucination of Hume’s missing shade of blue. So the
gappy content property-cluster view must reject the Aristotelian princi-
ple to avoid either (i) denying that hallucinations of uninstantiated
properties are impossible or (ii) positing experiential contents that do
not have sufficient structure to account for phenomenal differences
between hallucinations of uninstantiated properties.
More generally, any content property-cluster view is committed to
accepting the existence of uninstantiated universals to avoid restricting
possible hallucinations to hallucinations of properties that are instanti-
ated somewhere. So since such a view is committed to rejecting the
Aristotelian principle and accepting a Platonic ‘two realms’-view, it
inherits the metaphysical problem of the pure property-cluster view.
For the reasons given above, I take this problem to be sufficient to
reject any such view in favor of a view that can accommodate with the
Aristotelian principle.
Does the content property-cluster view inherit the phenomenological
problems of the pure property-cluster view as well? The answer to this
question depends on how one understands the relation between the
experiencing subject and the content of her experience. Russell argued
that subjects stand in acquaintance relations to the objects and proper-
ties that constitute propositions. He used the terms ‘‘acquaintance’’ and
‘‘awareness’’ synonymously (1913, p. 35), and indeed the standard
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reading of Russell has it that his acquaintance relations are a particular
kind of awareness relations.14 If we stand in awareness relations to the
properties and objects that constitute the content of our experience,
then the Russellian view inherits all the phenomenological problems of
pure property-cluster views. Such a view is committed to the phenome-
nologically controversial thesis that hallucinating subjects are either
sensorily or cognitively aware of abstract entities.15 Byrne (2001) and
Pautz (2007) argue that the content of experience is a Russellian propo-
sition, but deny that experiencing subjects stand in acquaintance or
awareness relations to this proposition or its constituents. If this
approach works, then such a view inherits only the metaphysical prob-
lem of the pure property-cluster view and not its phenomenological
problems.
2. Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology
So far I have articulated the problems of disjunctivism and any view
according to which perceptions or hallucinations are a matter of stand-
ing in an awareness relation to abstract entities. In the rest of this
paper, I will present an account of phenomenology that avoids positing
that subjects are aware of abstract entities or any other peculiar enti-
ties. The problems of peculiar entity views are avoided, if hallucinating
subjects are understood not as related to abstract entities, but rather as
employing concepts (or analogous nonconceptual structures), where
concepts take objects, property-instances, or other external, mind-inde-
pendent entities as inputs and yield contents as outputs.16 As I will
14 For a recent interpretation of Russell’s acquaintance relations along these lines, see
Campbell 2009.
15 For views that are committed to the thesis that subjects are either sensorily or cog-
nitively aware of abstract entities, such as (uninstantiated) universals, propositions
or their constituents, see McGinn 1982, Harman 1990, Davies 1992, Lycan 1996,
Dretske 2000, and Tye 2002. It is important to note that such views are not com-
mitted to the thesis that we are aware of abstract entities or any other peculiar enti-
ties as such.
16 The idea that concepts take objects, property-instances, or other external, mind-
independent entities as inputs and yield contents as outputs can be interpreted
functionally. In formal discussion, functions are understood as necessarily requiring
an input to have an output. As I am understanding concepts, one can employ a
concept and thereby be in a mental state with content, despite the fact that one is
not perceptually related to anything. So one can employ a concept and yield a con-
tent as output even if there is no input. So if the idea that concepts take objects or
property-instances as inputs and yield contents as outputs is interpreted function-
ally, then it is important to note that the notion of function in play is distinct from
the one in formal discussion. Alternatively, the view presented here could be refor-
mulated by arguing that in the case of a hallucination, the input is the empty set.
This would allow being in tune with the use of ‘‘functions’’ in formal discussions,
but would require accepting the existence of the empty set.
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show in the next section, these concepts correspond to mode of presen-
tation types. The notion of property-instances in play is best illustrated
with an example: when one sees two qualitatively identical white cups,
the cups instantiate the same property, but the instances are distinct.
When one suffers a hallucination as of a white cup, it seems to one that
there is a white cup present, but since one is not perceptually related to
the object that it seems to one is present, one is not perceptually related
to any instance of whiteness. As I will argue, possessing a concept
grounds the ability to refer to external, mind-independent objects or
property-instances. For the sake of definiteness, I will focus on the case
in which experience is a matter of employing concepts, but everything I
say can be reformulated in terms of nonconceptual structures rather
than concepts. Given the notion of concepts in use, it is unproblematic
to attribute basic concepts to non-rational animals. However, even if
this notion of concepts is compatible with attributing basic concepts to
non-rational animals, it is plausible that perceptual content is consti-
tuted at least in part nonconceptually.
On the view I am suggesting, the content of experience is not consti-
tuted by naked objects and properties as on the property-cluster view
and most other peculiar entity views. Rather the content of experience
is constituted by modes of presentations of objects and properties.
More specifically, the content ensues from employing concepts that
pick out objects and property-instances. When a subject hallucinates,
the concepts that she employs are empty. When a subject perceives,
objects or property-instances are subsumed under the concepts
employed: the objects to which she is perceptually related are subsumed
under the employed object-concepts; the property-instances to which
she is perceptually related are subsumed under the employed property-
concepts. The common element between hallucinations and perceptions
is constituted by the concepts that the subject employs in a sensory
mode regardless of whether she is hallucinating or perceiving. The rele-
vant sensory modes are modes such as seeing, hearing, touching, smell-
ing, or tasting.
How can such a view explain the phenomenology of hallucinations?
I will argue that employing concepts and analogous nonconceptual
structures in a sensory mode grounds the phenomenology of experi-
ence. So any experience in which the same concepts are employed in
the same mode will have the same phenomenology. Given this con-
straint there are two ways of understanding the relation between the
phenomenology and the employed concepts. One could identify the
phenomenology of experience with employing concepts and analogous
nonconceptual structures in a sensory mode. Alternatively, the phe-
nomenology can be argued to supervene on employing concepts and
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analogous nonconceptual structures in a sensory mode. I will argue for
the identity thesis, but my argument needs to be modified only slightly
to be compatible with the weaker supervenience thesis. On both ver-
sions of the view, whether or not a concept is empty will not affect the
phenomenology of the experience. Only if this is the case, can the view
satisfy the indistinguishability desideratum. For only if it is not
revealed in phenomenology whether a concept is empty or not can a
perception and a hallucination be subjectively indistinguishable.
Let’s call such a view ontological minimalism about phenomenology,
or minimalism for short. The view is ontologically minimalist since it
accounts for the phenomenology of perceptual experience without hav-
ing to appeal to awareness of peculiar entities and since it vindicates
the Aristotelian principle in ways that I will explain in the rest of this
section. By rejecting the Russellian thesis that content is constituted by
naked objects and properties in favor of the thesis that content ensues
from employing concepts that pick out objects and property-instances,
minimalism about phenomenology entails a Fregean view of content.
While minimalism appeals to concepts employed in experience and thus
appeals to abstract entities, I will argue that experiencing subjects do
not stand in an awareness relation to these abstract entities. On the
notion of concepts in play, concepts are understood in terms of their
tokens, which in turn are analyzed in terms of the very mind-indepen-
dent objects and property-instances that we are perceptually related to
when we perceive.
The suggested way of thinking about experience makes it possible to
acknowledge that a hallucinating subject does not stand in an aware-
ness relation to anything despite enjoying a phenomenology that pur-
ports to be of mind-independent objects and property-instances. To
defend the conjunction of these two theses it will be helpful to uncover
an ambiguity in the notion of ‘‘awareness of’’. On one understanding,
for a subject to be aware of something means that the subject stands in
an awareness relation to that very object or property. This notion of
‘‘awareness of’’ implies that a subject cannot be aware of something
without standing in an awareness relation to that very thing. Call this
extensional awareness. Peculiar entity views take ‘‘awareness of’’ to
imply extensional awareness. If ‘‘awareness of’’ were necessarily exten-
sional awareness, then a hallucinating subject must be standing in an
awareness relation to some object or property. Since she is by definition
not related to an external, mind-independent object and the properties
this object instantiates, such as a white cup, the object in question must
be a peculiar entity.
If we recognize that there is a second way of understanding ‘‘aware-
ness of’’ this conclusion can be avoided. On a second understanding,
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for a subject to be aware of something means only that the subject is
in a mental state that purports to be of something. This understanding
of ‘‘awareness of’’ allows that a subject can be aware of something
without standing in an awareness relation to any relevant thing. So on
this understanding, being aware of something does not entail the exis-
tence of what she is aware of. Call this intensional awareness. In this
intensional sense, one can be aware of ghosts.
Another way to bring the distinction between the two notions of
‘‘awareness of’’ into focus is to center on the grammatical structure of
experiential reports. Denying that hallucinating subjects stand in aware-
ness relations to an object is not to deny the linguistic fact that the
expression ‘‘I hallucinate’’ takes a grammatical object. The important
thing to recognize is that this grammatical object does not correspond
to an ontological existent to which the hallucinating subject stands in
an awareness relation. It merely marks what the hallucinating subjects
takes to be present and what she would be perceptually related to, were
she perceiving an external, mind-independent object.
The distinction between extensional and intensional awareness is
analogous to the distinction between relational and phenomenological
particularity.17 A mental state instantiates relational particularity if and
only if the experiencing subject is perceptually related to the particular
object perceived. A mental state instantiates phenomenological particu-
larity only if it (perceptually) seems to the subject as if there is a partic-
ular object present. More generally, a mental state instantiates
phenomenological particularity only if the particularity is in the scope
of how things seem to the subject. Every experience exhibits phenome-
nological particularity. Indeed it is unclear what it would be to have an
experience that seems to be of an external, mind-independent object
without it seeming to the subject that there is a particular object pres-
ent. If a subject has an experience that is intentionally directed at a
particular object it will seem to her as if she is experiencing a particular
object—regardless of whether there is in fact an object present. If this
is right, then any view on which experience is object-directed is com-
mitted to saying that perceptual experience exhibits phenomenological
particularity. When one hallucinates it seems to one as if one is perceiv-
ing a particular object—at least if the hallucination is phenomenally
indistinguishable from a perception. So hallucinations instantiate phe-
nomenological particularity. Since hallucinating subjects are not related
to a mind-independent object, hallucinations do not instantiate
relational particularity.
17 For a defense of the distinction between relational and phenomenological particu-
larity, see my 2010.
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While the distinction between extensional and intensional awareness
is analogous to the distinction between relational and phenomenologi-
cal particularity, it is however important to note that they pertain to
different sets of issues. Extensional and intensional awareness both con-
cern the phenomenology of experience. By contrast, whether a mental
state instantiates relational particularity is, I argue, not revealed in the
phenomenology of the experience.
Recognizing the distinction between extensional and intensional
awareness makes it possible to accept the Aristotelian principle without
forfeiting a positive account of hallucinations. So it makes it possible
to understand properties in terms of their instances, but nonetheless
give a positive account of the phenomenology of hallucinations. The
entities that a subject stands in an awareness relation to are always
either material, mind-independent objects such as cats and chairs, the
properties that these objects instantiate, or a combination of property-
instances and objects. So according to minimalism, subjects are only
ever extensionally aware of mind-independent, external objects, prop-
erty-instances, or other concrete mind-independent entities.
Now, one may wonder how such an account can secure the iden-
tity of hallucinated objects across hallucinations. It cannot, but this is
a desirable consequence of the view. A hallucinating subject may
form false judgments on the basis of her hallucinations and believe
that the unicorn it seemed to her she was seeing yesterday is the very
same unicorn as the one that it seems to her she is seeing today. But
the identity postulated here is within the scope of how things seem to
the subject and thus based on mere phenomenological particularity.
There is nothing in the world that corresponds to how things seem to
the subject. So there is nothing in the world that corresponds to this
phenomenological particularity. In other words, the phenomenological
particularity of her experience is not matched with any relational par-
ticularity. Since the subject is not standing in an awareness relation
to any unicorns, no identity of the hallucinated objects can be
secured.
So far I have specified concepts roughly as taking objects, property-
instances, or other external, mind-independent entities as inputs and
yielding contents as outputs. If concepts are understood in terms of
what they refer to or what they pick out, then the question arises of
how minimalism can account for experiences of uninstantiated proper-
ties. In order to address this question, it is necessary to get a clearer
understanding of the notion of concepts. On the notion in play, con-
cepts cannot be analyzed independently of analyzing what it means to
possess a concept. Possessing a concept grounds the ability to refer to
the external, mind-independent objects or property-instances that the
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concept is of.18 This ability involves among other things being able to
discriminate between the things that fall under the concept and those
that do not.19 So a subject who possesses the concept of redness must
be able to use it to refer to red things, which involves discriminating
red things from things that are not red. The ability to refer to objects
and property-instances may be analyzed as constituting a kind of
know-how, but one that should not be understood as over-intellectual-
izing the requirement for concept-possession. Following Ryle (1949), I
am using ‘know-how’ to refer to a practical, non-intellectual conception
that non-rational beings could have.20
To avoid terminological confusion, the notion of concepts in play
must be distinguished from any notion on which concepts are mental
representations (Fodor 1975, 1998, Jackendoff 1987, Lawrence and
Margolis 1999, Carruthers 2000, Prinz 2002) or prototypes (Rosch
1978, Smith and Medin 1981), as well as any view according to which
concepts are properties.
The thesis that concepts cannot be analyzed independently of their
possession conditions does not entail that concepts are behaviorally
reduced. The thesis does not even entail that one needs to successfully
apply a concept to count as possessing the concept. The thesis is rather
that one needs to have the ability to successfully apply a concept to count
as possessing the concept. One may possess a concept, but not be in an
environment that contains the objects and property-instances that fall
under the concept and therefore not be able to successfully apply the con-
cept. Moreover, as I will argue, one may never have been in an environ-
ment that contains the objects and property-instances that fall under the
concept and nonetheless possess the concept that grounds the ability to
refer to such objects and property-instances. So concepts ground the abil-
ity to refer to mind-independent objects and property-instances irrespec-
tive of whether these objects and property-instances are in fact present in
the environment of the experiencing subject. If one employs a concept, in
an environment in which no relevant objects and property-instances are
18 For a detailed discussion of concepts as analyzed in terms of their possession con-
ditions, which in turn are analyzed in terms of abilities, see Peacocke 1992 and
Sosa 1993.
19 It would lead too far afield to discuss here just what the conditions are for count-
ing as being able to discriminate. For discussion of the capacity to discriminate, see
McLaughlin 1996.
20 Ryle’s conception of know-how has been famously criticized by Carr (1979) and
more recently by Stanley and Williamson (2001). In short, the criticism is that
‘know-how’ expresses the same relation as ‘know-that’. Addressing this criticism
would only affect the wording of my argument. For a critical discussion of Stanley
and Williamson’s argument and a defense of a concept of know-how, see Hornsby
2004.
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present, then one fails to refer to what the concept purports to pick out.
If one fails to refer, then the concept employed remains empty.
This way of thinking about concepts is closely related to two prominent
views, so it will be helpful to contrast it with those views. It is closely
related to Frege’s understanding of concepts (Begriffe), but while Frege
argues that concepts are functions from objects to truth-values, I am
understanding concepts as taking objects, property-instances, or other
external, mind-independent entities as inputs and yielding contents as out-
puts. The idea in play is particularly closely related to Peacocke’s (1992)
influential view of concepts.21 But while Peacocke argues that concepts are
Fregean senses, I am thinking of the output of concepts as Fregean senses.
On the way I am understanding the term, concepts themselves are not
content tokens.22 Following both Frege and Peacocke, I am understand-
ing concepts as abstract entities, rather than as psychological entities.
Although concepts are abstract entities, I will argue that any given con-
cept is necessarily employed at some point. Insofar as employing a con-
cept tokens the concept and these tokens can in turn be analyzed in terms
of the very objects and property-instances that the concept is of, accepting
the suggested notion of concepts is compatible with accepting the Aristo-
telian principle that the existence of a type depends on its tokens, which
depend in turn on concrete entities of the physical world. Thus any com-
mitment to a Platonic ‘two realms’-view can be avoided.
There are several possible ways of analyzing concepts, given the
articulated constraints. On the understanding of concepts in play, conn-
cepts could be analyzed in terms of conceptual roles as long as these
conceptual roles are ‘long-armed’ (Block 1986, p. 636), that is, as long
as they include relations to the world.23 By building on causal
approaches (Kripke 1972 ⁄1980, Putnam 1975, Burge 1979, Devitt
1981), they could alternatively be analyzed in terms of mere relations
to the world without any appeal to relations to other concepts. For the
purposes of this paper, we can remain neutral on this issue. The impor-
tant point is that possessing a concept grounds the ability to refer to
objects or property-instances in the world.
I should not leave the impression that the content of experience is
conceptually structured. As stated earlier, my argument does not
21 See also Sosa 1993.
22 Depending on how one understands contents, this may be a mere terminological
difference. Peacocke could be read as equating concepts with mode of presentation
types. This is just the understanding of concepts that I will argue for in §3. While
concepts are mode of presentation types, the output of a concept is a mode of pre-
sentation token.
23 For different versions of such a view, see Sellars 1963, Harman 1987, Dummett
1993, and Brandom 1994.
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depend on experiential content being exclusively conceptually struc-
tured. There are powerful reasons to think that the content of experi-
ence is at least in part nonconceptually structured. Moreover, even if
content is conceptually structured, this is compatible with understanding
the state of experience as nonconceptual in that the experiencing sub-
ject does not have the cognitive tools to articulate the conceptually
structured content of her experience.24
Now, how should we understand the relation between the content of
perception and the content of hallucination on the suggested view?
More specifically, how should we understand the relation between
being perceptually related to external physical entities, such as white
cups, and employing concepts that purport to be of such entities? In
order to address this question, it will be necessary first to distinguish
two possible versions of minimalism. On one version, perceptions of
property-instances are necessary to acquire the concept that grounds
the ability to have hallucinations that are intensionally of such prop-
erty-instances. Similarly, perceptions of objects are necessary to acquire
the concept that grounds the ability to have hallucinations as of objects
of the same type. Let’s call this view grounded minimalism. This version
of minimalism posits that the content of hallucination is derivative of
the content of perception either insofar as it ensues from reemploying
and possibly recombining the concepts acquired in past perceptions or
insofar as the concepts employed in hallucinations are extrapolations of
concepts acquired in past perceptions.
On a second version of minimalism, hallucinations of properties or
objects are possible even if one has not had past perceptions of
instances of the same property or the same type of object. So this ver-
sion of the view does not require that the concepts employed in halluci-
nations be acquired through perceptions. It allows that one can possess
concepts without having been perceptually related to the objects or
property-instances that the concept picks out. Let’s call this view
ungrounded minimalism. This version of minimalism allows that a sub-
ject could have a hallucination as of, say, an object unlike anything she
has seen before. On a radical version of ungrounded minimalism, hav-
ing a hallucination is sufficient to acquire the ability to refer to exter-
nal, mind-independent objects and property-instances.25 The radical
24 For a defense of the distinction between content and state (non)conceptualism, see
Heck 2000.
25 Pautz (forthcoming) argues that through hallucinations subjects can acquire the
capacity to have beliefs that involve properties. As he understands it, the capacity
to have beliefs that involve properties does not imply that subjects have the capacity
to refer or pick out these properties and so does not amount to a version of what I
am calling radical ungrounded minimalism.
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version is only plausible on the assumption that hallucinations of
objects and property-instances (to which one has never been perceptu-
ally related) do not involve at least imagining such objects or property-
instances, where imagination involves more high-level mental capacities
than mere hallucination. On a modest version, the concepts employed
in hallucinations are acquired through testimony or imagination. If per-
ceptual concepts are understood to be grounded in accurate percep-
tions, then only the modest version can be plausible. For only if some
bridge exists between my hallucination of a property that I have never
seen and someone else’s perception of an instance of this property, can
the concept I employ in hallucination be plausibly understood to be
grounded in accurate perceptions. We can remain neutral here on
whether or not ungrounded minimalism is best understood in its radi-
cal or modest version. The important point for the discussion is that
on both versions of ungrounded minimalism, a subject need not have
had perceptions of objects and property-instances to have hallucina-
tions as of such objects and property-instances. So ungrounded mini-
malism posits that a brain in a vat could have hallucinations as of
white cups.26 On both the grounded and the ungrounded versions of
minimalism, hallucinations are externally directed without involving
awareness relations to abstract entities, sense-data, or any other pecu-
liar entities.
The grounded and the ungrounded versions of minimalism both face
problems if they are taken independently. Taken independently,
grounded minimalism faces the problem that one can only have halluci-
nations of objects and property-instances if one has had perceptions of
objects and property-instances that are sufficiently similar that one
could successfully extrapolate from these experiences. Taken indepen-
dently, ungrounded minimalism faces the problem that accounting for
hallucinations as of objects or property-instances that are not suffi-
ciently similar to one that the relevant subject has perceived requires
rejecting the Aristotelian principle. Both problems are avoided if it is
recognized that an analysis of what grounds our abilities to refer to
objects and property-instances requires combining the two views. I will
argue that grounded minimalism holds globally, but that ungrounded
minimalism holds locally.
26 More specifically, radical ungrounded minimalism has it that an isolated brain in a
vat could have such hallucinations, while modest ungrounded minimalism has it
that a brain in a vat could only have hallucinations as of objects and property-
instances, if the brain has acquired the relevant concepts from subjects who have
perceived sufficiently similar objects and property-instances. If it is not possible for
brains in vats to acquire concepts in such a way, then modest ungrounded minimal-
ism posits that brains in vats cannot have hallucinations as of white cups.
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Let’s follow the common understanding of perceptual concepts as
concepts that are of perceivable objects or property-instances. And let’s
assume for the sake of argument that any given perceptual concept is
grounded in perception insofar as the existence of a perceptual concept
depends on perceptions of the objects or property-instances that the
concept is of.27 If this is right, then it follows that grounded minimal-
ism holds globally: there cannot exist a perceptual concept that is not
grounded in perception. It does not, however, follow from this that an
individual subject must have had perceptions of the objects or prop-
erty-instances that the concept is of to possess the relevant concept. So
it does not follow that grounded minimalism holds locally. It follows
only that there cannot exist perceptual concepts of objects or property-
instances that have not been perceived by someone, somewhere. A
subject can acquire a concept through testimony and thus possess a
perceptual concept without having perceived any objects or property-
instances that the concept picks out. If this is right, then any given
individual perceiver can have hallucinations as of objects and property-
instances that she has not perceived. It follows from this that
ungrounded minimalism can hold locally, even if grounded minimalism
holds globally. Moreover, it follows that there cannot be a world in
which there are only brains in a vat that could have hallucinations as
of white cups.
In light of these clarifications about the notion of concept, we can
address the question of how minimalism can account for the possibility
of hallucinations of uninstantiated properties while recognizing the
Aristotelian principle. A hallucination of supersaturated red could be
analyzed as a result of combining the concepts of red and saturated-
ness, thereby inducing an experience of a particularly saturated red.
Alternatively, such a hallucination could be analyzed as a result of
extrapolating from experiences of red with regular levels of saturated-
ness.28
By accepting that grounded minimalism holds globally, the defended
view satisfies the Aristotelian principle. By accepting that ungrounded
minimalism holds locally, the defended view allows that a subject can
have hallucinations as of objects and property-instances unlike any she
has seen. Finally, by accepting that the content of hallucination is
derivative of the content of perception either insofar as it recombines
the concepts acquired in past perceptions or insofar as the concepts
27 For a defense of this thesis, see Peacocke 1992 and Prinz 2002. This thesis is
famously challenged by Fodor (1998).
28 It would lead too far afield to discuss the details of what it takes to extrapolate a
concept here. For an excellent discussion, see Browne 2002.
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employed in hallucinations are extrapolations of concepts acquired in
past perceptions, the defended view can allow for hallucinations of
uninstantiated properties while satisfying the Aristotelian principle.29
I have argued that hallucinating subjects employ concepts that
account for the intentional directedness to a seeming particular object
and the properties that this object instantiates. But there is no need to
think that employing such concepts entails the existence of the objects
and property-instances that the concepts purport to pick out. Employ-
ing concepts necessitates only intensional awareness of the objects and
property-instances that the concepts purport to pick out. It does not
necessitate extensional awareness. A subject can employ a concept
while failing to refer to the object or property-instance that the con-
cepts purports to be of. If a hallucinating subject is not related to any-
thing, then the concepts she employs remain empty.
As I have argued, possessing a concept grounds the ability to pick
out the objects or property-instances that the concept is of. Therefore,
the phenomenology that ensues from employing concepts is inherently
related to the objects and property-instances that they pick out. So
while minimalism analyzes phenomenology with appeal to concepts
and thus abstract entities, these concepts are in turn analyzed in terms
of perceptual relations to external, mind-independent objects and prop-
erty-instances. By doing so, minimalism takes on board the naı¨ve real-
ist insight that being in a mental state with a certain phenomenology
can be analyzed in terms of perceptual relations to external, mind-inde-
pendent objects and properties. This insight demystifies what it means
to be in a phenomenal state. Indeed, it paves the way for a naturalized
view of the phenomenology of perceptual experience.30 However, by
arguing that all there is to being in a mental state with a certain phe-
nomenology is to be perceptually related to mind-independent objects
or property-instances, naı¨ve realists leave mysterious how one could be
29 Can Jackson’s Mary have hallucinations of red? Mary is a color scientist who
knows everything about colors but who lives in a black and white world and so
has never seen any colors. So she could not have acquired the concept of red
through perceptions of instances of red. If radical ungrounded minimalism holds
locally, then Mary could have hallucinations of red. However, if one rejects the
radical ungrounded view in favor of the modest ungrounded view, then it is plausi-
ble that perceptions of colors are necessary for a person to imagine what it would
be like to experience red. So one might argue that some perceptions of colors other
than red are necessary to have hallucinations of red. If this is right, then Mary
could not have hallucinations of red, but her sister Anna could. Anna is a color
scientist who knows everything about colors but who lives in a world with all the
colors except red. So while she has seen all other colors, she has never seen red.
For an excellent discussion of experiences of novel colors, see Macpherson 2003.
30 See in particular Fish 2009 for an account that brings out the naturalistic advanta-
ges of naı¨ve realism.
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in a phenomenal state if one is not related to the very mind-indepen-
dent objects or property-instances that one’s phenomenal state purports
to be of.31 By introducing concepts that ground our ability to refer to
these external, mind-independent objects and properties, minimalism
rejects the radical naı¨ve realist thesis that all there is to being in a men-
tal state with a certain phenomenology is to be related to mind-inde-
pendent objects or property-instances. By rejecting the radical naı¨ve
realist thesis, the presented view constitutes a positive account of hallu-
cinations on which subjectively indistinguishable hallucinations and
perceptions share a common factor that grounds the phenomenology
of the experiences.
So against disjunctivists, I have argued that perceptions and halluci-
nations share a common element that grounds the phenomenology of
the experiences. However with disjunctivists, I have argued that halluci-
nations exhibit a deficiency that can only be explained with reference
to accurate perceptions. Hallucinations are derivative of perceptions
insofar as the concept employed in hallucinations can only be specified
with reference to their possible roles in perceptions. I have argued that
possessing concept grounds the ability to pick out its referent. Since
concepts are analyzed in terms of perceptual relations to external,
mind-independent objects and property-instances, minimalism not only
satisfies the Aristotelian principle, it moreover amounts to a naturalized
view of the phenomenology of experience.
In the next sections, I will elaborate on the notion of content that
minimalism implies and will defend the view against possible objec-
tions. But first, it will be helpful to clarify how the suggested view can
account for the difference between the phenomenology of experience
and thought. This difference can be accounted for in a number of ways
within the framework provided. I have assumed that there is a specific
sensory mode in which concepts are employed when experiencing.32
One way to account for the difference between the phenomenology of
experiencing a white cup and thinking about a white cup is with regard
to differences in the mode in which the relevant concepts are employed.
A second way of accounting for the difference is to argue that in con-
trast to thought, the content of experience is necessarily constituted at
least in part by nonconceptual structures (e.g. Peacocke 1992, Tye
2000, Chalmers 2004). It is plausible that experiences differ from
thoughts in both ways. If my argument holds at all, it holds regardless
31 For a defense of this radical naı¨ve realist thesis, see Campbell 2002, Brewer 2006,
and Fish 2009. Martin (2004) argues for a more moderate version of naı¨ve realism.
32 Among others, Crane (2003) and Chalmers (2004) argue that experience and
thought differ with regard to modes or manners.
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of what stance one takes on these possible ways of accounting for the
difference between the phenomenology of thought and experience.
The difference between the phenomenology of perception and
thought has been accounted for in many other ways. A particularly
influential one is to argue that there are qualia, sensations, or phenom-
enal properties present in experience but not in thought. Peacocke
(1983, 2008) and Block (2003) among others argue that there are
aspects of the phenomenology of experience—for instance blurriness
and afterimages—that are not grounded in content. Accepting this idea
would require modifying minimalism by arguing that only part of phe-
nomenology is identified with employing concepts and anologous non-
conceptual structures, namely only that part that purports to be of
external, mind-independent objects and property-instances. Given this
modification, accepting the existence of non-representational qualia,
sensations, or phenomenal properties is compatible with minimal-
ism—as long as the experiencing subject is not understood as standing
in awareness relations to these sensations or phenomenal properties.
But although compatible, I will show that the view presented under-
mines the need to appeal to such entities.
It is possible to account for phenomena such as blurriness and after-
images within an unrestricted representational framework (for defense,
see Tye 2000 and Byrne 2001). This strategy is more in tune with the
tenor of the argument presented here. Within the minimalist frame-
work, a blurry experience of a white cup can be analyzed as being a
matter of employing the concept of blurriness (among other concepts).
The concept blurriness is grounded in perceptions of instances of blur-
riness. To give an example of a perception of an instance of blurriness:
when I look out of the window on a rainy day, the tree in front of my
window is presented blurrily to me because of the raindrops on the
window.33 As I have argued, the subject who hallucinates blurriness
need not herself have perceived instances of blurriness in the world.
The concept could be acquired through testimony. So to ground the
concept of blurriness in perception it is only necessary that someone
has had perceptions of blurriness. Now, seeing something as blurry is
of course distinct from seeing something blurrily, but the very same
concept of blurriness can be understood to be employed in both experi-
ences. The difference between seeing something as blurry and seeing
something blurrily can be accounted for in virtue of what blurriness is
attributed to. If one experiences an object as blurry, blurriness is attrib-
uted to that object. If one experiences blurrily, blurriness is attributed
33 For a detailed discussion of how such properties can be analyzed as mind-indepen-
dent, external properties, see my 2008.
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to one’s experience. In this way, minimalism undermines the need to
appeal to qualia, sensations, or phenomenal properties to account for
the phenomenology of perceptions and hallucinations.34
3. The Relational Content of Perceptual Experience
I have argued that hallucinating subjects employ the same concepts
and nonconceptual structures that they employ to refer to objects and
property-instances when perceiving. Since a hallucinating subject does
not stand in an awareness relation to objects or property-instances, the
concepts she employs remain empty. How should one think about the
content that ensues from employing concepts and nonconceptual struc-
tures? In this section, I will specify the implications of ontological mini-
malism on the content of experience.
The thesis that content ensues from employing concepts that pick
out objects and property-instances implies that the content of experi-
ence is both inherently relational and Fregean.35 What does it mean for
content to be inherently relational? If the content of experience ensues
from employing concepts and possessing a concept is a matter of being
able to pick out its referent, then relations to objects and property-
instances are implicated in the very nature of experiential content.
Moreover, if the fact that concepts pick out objects and property-
instances in some situations and not in others has any semantic signifi-
cance, then the content ensuing from employing these concepts will
depend at least in part on the situation in which they are employed.
Another way of expressing the same idea is to say that the accuracy
condition of experiential content depends for the particular objects and
property-instances to which the subject is related and not just on the
way in which the subject experiences the objects and properties. A con-
tent is inherently relational if and only if it depends at least in part on
the mind-independent objects and property-instances that the content is
34 There are ways of understanding qualia on which they are simply identified with
the phenomenology of experience, such that any phenomenological state necessarily
instantiates qualia. This understanding of qualia implies that experiences trivially
instantiate qualia. But if that is all that is meant with qualia, then introducing qua-
lia just amounts to a reformulation of the fact that experiences are phenomenologi-
cal states. For a discussion of this set of issues, see Stoljar 2004.
It should be noted that it has been argued that if inverted spectrum scenarios
are empirically possible, then introducing qualia is necessary, where qualia are
understood as more substantive than simply what can be identified with the phe-
nomenology of experience (Shoemaker 1982). However, as Egan (2006) has argued
convincingly, it can be ruled out on conceptual grounds that inverted spectrum
scenarios are empirically possible.
35 For a detailed development of this way of understanding the content of perception,
see my 2010.
ONTOLOGICAL MINIMALISM ABOUT PHENOMENOLOGY 25
of. We can call a content that is inherently relational in the sense artic-
ulated a relational content.
Relational contents differ depending on what object or property-
instance (if any) the subject is related to. So the token content covaries
with the environment of the experiencing subject. In the case of an
accurate perception, the token content determines a referent. Insofar as
the token relational content is individuated in part by the object or
property-instance, which it determines, it is at least in part dependent
on the environment of the experiencing subject. Another way of
expressing the same idea is to say that relational contents are mental
indexicals. A content determines the contextual relation that something
must bear to a mental state to be the referent of that mental state.
How should we understand the Fregean nature of these relational
contents? If perceptual content is inherently relational as argued, then
it must be understood as constituted by de re modes of presentations
rather than de dicto modes of presentations. Were perceptual content
constituted by de dicto modes of presentations, then a two-stage view
of determining reference would be implied. On such a two-stage view,
we first represent a non-relational content, and in a second step we
refer to external object and properties on the basis of this content.36
The mental act of representing a de dicto mode of presentation is inde-
pendent of the second step in which an external particular may be
determined. Such a two-stage view faces the problem of how the con-
tent grounds the ability to refer to external particulars. This problem is
avoided, if perceptual content is understood to be constituted by de re
rather than de dicto modes of presentation. The introduction of de re
modes of presentation is motivated by recognizing that modes of pre-
sentation play a dual role: they have a specific cognitive significance
and they pick out or refer to objects and property-instances. If the role
of modes of presentation as picking out objects and property-instances
is taken seriously, then the mental state of a subject who successfully
picks out the object or property-instance at which she is intentionally
directed will arguably not be the same as the mental state of a subject
who fails to refer to the object or property-instance at which she is
intentionally directed.37 But a descriptive, de dicto mode of presentation
is not affected if there is no referent. By contrast to de dicto modes of
presentation, de re modes of presentation are inherently relational in
36 For an argument against such a two-stage view of determining the reference, see
Johnston 2004, p. 150f. Johnston does not distinguish between de dicto and de re
modes of presentation, and as a consequence sees the problem articulated in the
main text as a problem for any Fregean view tout court. As I will show it is only a
problem for a view on which Fregean senses are de dicto rather than de re.
37 For a defense of this thesis, see my forthcoming-b.
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that what object or property-instance (if any) the subject is related to
makes a constitutive difference to the nature of the content. So de re
modes of presentation constitutively depend on the objects or property-
instances that they pick out.
There are at least two ways of understanding relational contents and
consequently two ways of understanding de re modes of presentation.
On one view, a subject can only have an experience with content if she
is related to the very object that her experience purports to be of. Such
a view is motivated by a particular understanding of what it means to
represent an object: only if a subject is related to an object, can an
object be presented to her such that she could be representing the
object. On the basis of this way of understanding what it means to rep-
resent an object, the conclusion is drawn that a hallucinating subject is
not in a mental state with content, it only seems to her that she is rep-
resenting. There is only an illusion of content.38 So this view has it that
perceptual content is radically object-dependent. The problem with this
way of understanding perceptual content is that it downplays the cog-
nitive significance of modes of presentation. When a subject halluci-
nates, the way things seem to her plays a certain cognitive role. If it
seems to her that she is perceptually related to a white cup, she may
for example reach out and try to pick up the cup. By denying that hal-
lucinating subjects are in representational states, this state of affairs is
not explained. It is not clear how the illusion of content could motivate
the subject to act. Moreover, a view on which perceptual content is
radically object-dependent amounts to a disjunctivist view of experience
and faces the problems of such a view.
These problems are avoided, if relational contents are understood
not as radically object-dependent, but rather as partly object-dependent
or, more generally, as partly dependent on the environment of the
experiencing subject.39 I will call these contents potentially gappy Fre-
gean contents. Given that a hallucinating subject employs the very same
concepts as she would be employing were she successfully perceptually
related to objects and property-instances, there is no reason to think
that she is not in a mental state with content. Indeed, we can under-
stand the content of any two subjectively indistinguishable experiences
e1 and e2 in which a subject s is perceptually related to the same object
38 For a defense of such a view, see Evans 1982 and McDowell 1984.
39 Perry (1977), Peacocke (1981), Bach (1987 ⁄ 1994), and Recanati (1993) develop dif-
ferent ways of understanding de re modes of presentation that are not fully object-
dependent. The understanding of experiential content developed here turns out to
partly parallel their work as well as the work of so-called latitudinarians, according
to which de re attitudes (or contents) are a special case of de dicto attitudes (or
contents); see in particular Sosa 1970, 1995 and Jeshion 2002.
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o in the same way as including MOPr(o), where MOPr(o) is the output
of a concept that takes objects as inputs. A hallucination that is subjec-
tively indistinguishable from e1 is a matter of employing the same con-
cept, but since there is no object present the concept remains empty:
MOPr(__), where MOPr(__) is an empty concept. Modes of presenta-
tion of property-instances can be specified in an analogous way. So if I
perceive a white cup o, the content of my perception will be
<MOPr(o), MOPr(P)>
where MOPr(o) is a de re mode of presentation of the cup o and
MOPr(P) is a mode of presentation of the property that this object
instantiates. If I hallucinate a white cup and thus am not related to any




where MOP1r(__) in the object-place is an empty object-concept and
MOP2r(__) in the property place is an empty property-concept.
40 The
empty concept in the object-place specifies the kind of object that has
to be present for the experience to be accurate. It accounts for the
intentional directedness of the experience to a (seeming) particular
object. The empty concept in the property-place specifies the properties
that this object would instantiate, if the experience were accurate. Since
the hallucinating subject is not related to the object or property-
instances that the concepts employed purport to pick out, the modes of
presentation are gappy. The gap marks that there is a reference failure.
Although token modes of presentation covary with the situation in
which the subject experiences, the mode of presentation types remain
the same across subjectively indistinguishable experiences. The content
of a hallucination is a token of the same type of de re mode of presen-
tation as the token content of a subjectively indistinguishable percep-
tion. The modes of presentation types just are the concepts employed.
Insofar as an experiencing subject can employ a concept even if she is
not in an environment that contains the object or property-instance
that the concept purports to pick out, employing concepts is indepen-
dent of objects and property-instances. As a consequence, subjectively
indistinguishable experiences share a content element (namely mode of
presentation types) that is independent of objects and property-
instances. As I have shown, environment-dependence is not an essential
40 This way of thinking about the content of perception and hallucination builds on
my 2006.
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feature of potentially gappy Fregean contents. Although a part of the
content of an experience of a white cup is dependent on the environ-
ment in the case of a perception, the very same type of de re mode of
presentation can be tokened if no white cup is present. The token con-
tent of a hallucination of a white cup is naturally not dependent on
their being a white cup in the environment of the hallucinating subject.
4. The Metaphysics of Experience—Objections and Replies
I have developed a view of the common factor between subjectively
indistinguishable perceptions and hallucinations that avoids analyzing
experiences as involving awareness relations to abstract entities, sense-
data, or any other peculiar entities.
Objection 1.
One could object that concepts are abstract entities: the thesis that
experiencing subjects employ concepts implies that they are related to
these concepts.
Response.
My aim was not to avoid all reference to abstract entities, nor was my
aim to argue against all versions of the thesis that subjects are related
to abstract entities. My aim was rather to argue against the thesis that
experiencing subjects stand in awareness relations to abstract entities or
any other peculiar entities. Moreover, my aim was to vindicate the
Aristotelian principle and thus understand abstract entities or any other
types in terms of their instances. As I will show, the suggested view
does not entail that experiencing subjects stand in awareness relations
to concepts and it vindicates the Aristotelian principle.
One can quantify over concepts, therefore they must exist. Although
they exist, they are not extended and do not have a spatiotemporal
location. Moreover, they do not enter into causal interactions without
being employed in mental states. Since they do not have spatiotemporal
locations and do not enter into causal interactions, they must be
abstract. While concepts are abstract entities, minimalism does not
imply that experiencing subjects stand in awareness or acquaintance
relations to concepts. More specifically, minimalism does not explain
phenomenology in terms awareness or acquaintance relations to con-
cepts or any other abstract entities. I have argued rather that the phe-
nomenology of experience can be identified with employing concepts
and nonconceptual structures in a sensory mode. There is no reason to
think that this employment relation amounts to an awareness relation.
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Moreover on the view developed, concepts are analyzed in terms
of perceptual relations to the very external mind-independent objects or
property-instances that the concepts are of and that we are aware of
when we accurately perceive. As a consequence, the Aristotelian princi-
ple is vindicated. When we accurately perceive a white cup, we employ
concepts that pick out the very object and property-instances to which
we are perceptually related. When we hallucinate, we employ the very
same concepts that are grounded in such accurate perceptions.
Objection 2.
One could object that a content is an abstract entity: the thesis that
perceptual experiences have content implies that experiencing subjects
stand in an awareness relation to that content.
Response.
In order to respond to this objection, it will be helpful to distinguish
between three ways in which one might say that experiences have con-
tent. On one view, the thesis that experience has content is analyzed in
terms of the thesis that the experiencing subject stands in an awareness
relation to the content or its constituents, such that this awareness rela-
tion grounds the phenomenology of the experience. Call this the con-
tent awareness view. This view goes back to Russell (1913), who argued
that an experiencing subject stands in acquaintance relations to the
constituents of the proposition that characterizes her experience. In the
tradition of Russell, some views according to which experience is a
propositional attitude to a content are formulated in a way that implies
a content awareness view. However as noted earlier, many who hold
that the content of experience is a Russellian proposition analyze expe-
rience in terms of a propositional attitude to a content without that
propositional attitude constituting an awareness relation to that con-
tent or its constituents (e.g. Byrne 2001, Pautz 2007).
A very different way of understanding what it means to say that
experiences have content is to say that every experience can be associ-
ated with a content that describes what the subject is aware of, without
that content being a proper part of the experience. Call this the associ-
ated content view. This view entails only that every mental event can be
described by articulating a sentence that has a certain content. Articu-
lating what contents can be associated with an experience is informa-
tive, but the view that such contents can be articulated does not entail
that the experiences have content in any substantive sense of ‘‘have’’.
In between these two poles is a view according to which experience
has content without the subject standing in an awareness relation to
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that content. The idea is that in virtue of being perceptually related to
an object or a property-instance, one represents that very object or
property-instance by employing concepts that pick out the relevant
object or property-instance. The content of the experience ensues from
employing concepts. So far there is no need to say that one stands in
an awareness relation to the content. What happens in the case of a
hallucination? One employs the very same concepts employed in per-
ception without being perceptually related to objects or property-
instances. As in the perceptual case, there is no need to say that one
stands in an awareness relation to the content. Rather one employs
concepts in virtue of which one is intentionally directed at what seems
to one to be an object or a property-instance. In this sense, the thesis
that experience has content does not entail that one stands in an aware-
ness relation to that content.
Objection 3.
It could be argued that the property-cluster theorist can analyze hallu-
cinations of properties such as supersaturated red in a way analogous
to the suggested view, thereby avoiding the metaphysical problems that
I have argued a property-cluster theorist faces. According to minimal-
ism, a hallucination of supersaturated red could be analyzed as a result
of jointly employing the concepts of red and saturatedness, thereby
inducing an experience of a particularly saturated red. Alternatively, a
hallucination of supersaturated red could be analyzed as a result of
extrapolating from experiences of red with regular levels of saturated-
ness. The property-cluster theorist could argue that supersaturated red
is a complex property and posit that while supersaturated red is unin-
stantiated, the properties that the cluster consists of are instantiated.
So hallucinations of supersaturated red can be analyzed in terms of
(awareness) relations to instantiated properties.41
Response.
While hallucinating a unicorn may be analyzable in terms of standing
in an awareness relation to an uninstantiated property-cluster that con-
sists of the instantiated properties of being white, having a single horn,
and being horse-shaped etc., it is more contentious that hallucinating
supersaturated red can be in analyzed in terms of standing in an aware-
ness relation to the uninstantiated complex property that consists of the
instantiated properties of redness and saturatedness. It is plausible that
all color properties are phenomenologically basic and that therefore
41 This objection is due to Adam Pautz.
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they cannot be analyzed in terms of more basic color properties.
However, if uninstantiated color properties can be analyzed as compos-
ites of instantiated color properties, then the metaphysical problem
would indeed be avoided. Nonetheless, the phenomenological problem
remains. A subject who suffers a non-veridical hallucination as of a cat
by definition does not stand in an awareness relation to a material,
mind-independent cat or any properties it instantiates. Since the prop-
erties that hallucinating subjects are said to be aware of are not instan-
tiated where they seem to be instantiated, the revised version of the
property-cluster view analyzes the phenomenology of hallucinations in
terms of awareness relations to universals. Given that universals are
not spatially extended it is unclear how one can be sensorily aware of
universals.
As I showed in my response to the previous two objections, mini-
malism does not require any commitment to the thesis that hallucinat-
ing subject stand in an awareness relations to abstract entities.
Moreover, in contrast to the property-cluster view, minimalism is not
commited to positing the existence of uninstantiated universals. Finally,
in contrast to the revised property-cluster view, minimalism is not com-
mitted to the contentious thesis that uninstantiated color properties can
be analyzed as composites of instantiated color properties.
Objection 4.
One could argue that if a property-cluster theorist accepts the distinc-
tion between intensional and extensional awareness, then she could
hold that hallucinating subjects are intensionally aware of properties.
Since intensional awareness relations do not require the existence of the
properties which one is aware of, such a view avoids the metaphysical
problems that I have argued a property-cluster theorist faces.42
Response.
Let’s assume for the sake of argument that this strategy would indeed
avoid the metaphysical problem. The problem with such a modified
property-cluster view is that it is unclear how it would amount to an
explanation of the phenomenology of experience. The property-cluster
view answers the hallucination question by arguing that hallucinating
subjects stand in awareness relations to (uninstantiated) property-clus-
ters. If these property-clusters are now considered to be not only poten-
tially uninstantiated but moreover non-existing it is unclear how
42 Thanks to Fred Dretske for pressing me on this point.
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appealing to them could explain the phenomenological nature of hallu-
cinations and more generally perceptual experiences.
Objection 5.
A third way in which the property-cluster theorist could aim to circum-
vent the metaphysical problem is to argue that supersaturated red is
instantiated, namely by the mental state of a subject who suffers a hal-
lucination of supersaturated red.43
Response.
While such an analysis would avoid the metaphysical problem of hav-
ing to accept the existence of uninstantiated universals, it would
amount to one of the following two undesirable views. On one view,
the phenomenology of hallucination is identified with the properties
(e.g. phenomenal properties) that the mental state is stipulated to be
constituted of. Arguably, such an approach would fail to give a non-
circular explanation of what accounts for the phenomenology of the
hallucination, since the phenomenology is now explained in terms of
properties of the mental state, the nature of which is the explanan-
dum.44 In this sense, such an approach simply reformulates the fact
that experiences are phenomenological states. On a second view, phe-
nomenology is explained in terms of awareness or acquaintance rela-
tions to concrete, mind-dependent entities, such as phenomenal
properties, sense-data, qualia, or Meinongian objects. This approach is
just a version of the peculiar entity view. The peculiar entities in ques-
tion are not abstract entities, but rather concrete, mind-dependent
entities.45
The aim of the paper was to explain phenomenology without having
to appeal to awareness relations to any entities other than the very
mind-independent objects and property-instances that the experiencing
subject is aware of. On the view I have suggested, phenomenology is
identified with employing concepts or analogous nonconceptual struc-
tures in a sensory mode. Concepts are in turn understood in terms of
perceptual relations to the very mind-independent objects or property-
instances that the concepts are of. While concepts are analyzed in terms
of such perceptual relations, they can be employed in environments
where the relevant objects or property-instances are not in fact present.
43 Thanks to Adam Pautz for a helpful email exchange on this set of issues.
44 It could be stipulated that these properties are in fact very different than the
explanandum, but such a stipulation would be at best ad hoc.
45 See Strawson 1979, for a classical, critical discussion of such views.
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I take such an account to give an adequate, naturalized explanation of
phenomenology.
5. Conclusion
I have developed a way of analyzing the phenomenology of experience
that does not require positing that hallucinating subjects stand in
awareness relations to abstract entities or any other peculiar entities. I
have argued that a hallucinating subject does not stand in an awareness
relation to anything despite enjoying a phenomenology that purports
to be of material mind-independent objects and property-instances.
Defending the conjunction of these two theses required distinguishing
between extensional and intensional awareness. As I argued, hallucinat-
ing subjects are not extensionally aware, but rather intensionally aware.
Recognizing this distinction cleared the path for a view on which hallu-
cinations have content, where this content has the same logical form as
the content of a subjectively indistinguishable perception. The concepts
and nonconceptual structures employed in hallucinations are the very
same as the ones that pick out objects and property-instances in per-
ceptions. So in contrast to disjunctivism, minimalism posits that per-
ceptions and hallucinations share a common element. The concepts and
nonconceptual structures that a hallucinating subject employs account
for the intentional directedness to seeming objects and property-
instances. Since the subject fails to refer to any objects or property-
instances, the concepts remain empty. Since the concepts remain empty,
the content of a hallucination is defective. As I argued, a hallucinating
subject only possesses concepts because she has the ability to refer to
the objects and property-instances that the concept is of. Since the con-
cepts employed in hallucinations can only be specified with reference to
their possible roles in perceptions, hallucinations exhibit a deficiency
that can only be explained with reference to accurate perceptions.
So minimalism reconciles the following four theses. First, there is a
proper common element between subjectively indistinguishable percep-
tions and hallucinations that grounds the phenomenology of the experi-
ences, thereby satisfying the indistinguishability desideratum. In this
respect, the view is an improvement over disjunctivism and naı¨ve real-
ism, that is, views according to which perceptions and hallucinations
do not share a common element. Second, the view does not require
positing that hallucinating or perceiving subjects stand in an awareness
relation to peculiar entities. In this respect, the view is ontologically
more minimalist than any view that must appeal to such entities. While
concepts are abstract entities, we do not stand in awareness relations to
concepts when we employ concepts. Moreover, on the notion of
34 SUSANNA SCHELLENBERG
concepts in play, there cannot be a perceptual concept that has not
been employed to refer to the very mind-independent objects or prop-
erty-instances that the concept is of. Third, the view satisfies the Aristo-
telian principle according to which the existence of any type depends
on its tokens that in turn depend on concrete entities of the physical
world. In this respect, the view is at an advantage over any view that
must assume a Platonic ‘two realms’-view. Finally, the view accounts
for the phenomenology of perceptions and hallucinations in terms of
relations to external, mind-independent objects and property-instances.
Thereby, it amounts to a naturalized view of the phenomenology of
experience.46
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